Despite a hundred years of discussion, I think the costs and benefits of simple and complex explanation in macrosociology are poorly understood. In most cases, the methodological debate is suffused with theoretical disagreement. Most recently, Kiser and Hechter (1991) sparked disputes about the role of theory in historical explanation that extended to a symposium about the status of rational choice theory and proposals for a relational sociology (Somers 1998; Kiser and Hechter 1998) . The latest rounds of debate indicate a basic conflict over the status of general laws in comparative and historical sociology. Such fundamental disagreement is a significant obstacle to synthesis or even evaluation of the relative merits of the arguments.
This article tries to move the pendulum away from theory and toward methodology. Instead of trying to adjudicate a basic conflict of worldviews, this article asks whether there is a principled reason to prefer simple or complex explanations, regardless of theoretical taste. To answer this question, I examine the merits of simple and complex explanation using a rudimentary logic of scientific explanation. This approach measures simple and complex explanations along a common metric that describes the weight of empirical evidence. This narrowly methodological objective is pursued with ideas from Bayesian statistics. This discussion is not methodological in the sense of prescribing a method for data analysis. Instead, Bayesian statistics are used to clarify the logic of social explanation by providing formal rules for learning from data. These rules are coherent in the technical sense of conforming to some basic precepts of rational choice under uncertainty. Unlike previous research that applies statistical ideas to defend parsimony and criticize complexity (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Goldthorpe 1997a) , Bayesian thinking points to a strong compromise between an a priori preference for simple or complex explanation that has a rigorous basis in the probability calculus. This position is illustrated in an analysis of the growth of labor unions in Sweden.
COMPLEX AND SIMPLE EXPLANATIONS
The relationship between history and sociology was recently reexamined in several prominent debates involving John Goldthorpe (1991, 199fa) and Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter (1991, 1998) . These were just the latest contributions to a century-long discussion of the distinctive features of a sociological account of large-scale social processes. This effort has enlisted philosophies of science, social theories, and specific techniques in arguing for parsimony or historical detail. Although the continuum between simple and complex explanation is richly populated by intermediate positions, some clear arguments describe the two approaches and their basic strengths and weaknesses.
Complexity and Historical Sensitivity
Contemporary comparative and historical sociology is distinguished by a renewed emphasis on historically sensitive explanation (Calhoun 1996; Paige 1999) . For the new macrosociology, social processes are contextual. A causal condition may have one effect in one setting, but a different effect in another. In a characteristic formulation, Tilly (1984, p. 79) celebrates "genuinely historical" research, which shows that the "time and place in which a structure or process appears makes a difference to its character." Recently, Paige (1999) identified this perspective with a theoretical outlook that justifies limited generalizations to well-defined historical conditions. In this approach, contextual explanations are applied to a relatively small number of cases. More idiographically, Quadagno and Knapp (1992, p. 502) argue that causal processes must be specified in terms of dates and place names. In their view, cases consist of complex combinations of characteristics and have highly differentiated identities. Although historical sensitivity can vary in degree, the many proponents share a belief in complex explanations that enlist additional conditions-specific features of the local context-to sustain causal arguments. From this perspective, historically specific explanations are causally complex.
Complexity in macrosociological explanation is illustrated by an institutional account of Swedish union growth. Although the following account is stylized, it helps illustrate historically sensitive explanations. Nearly all workers in Sweden are union members. While the growth of unions is often explained by business cycle fluctuations, the size of the Swedish labor movement has been traced to an unusual system of unemployment insurance, controlled by unions since the mid-1930s (Rothstein 1990 (Rothstein , 1992 . Union-controlled unemployment insurance-called a Ghent system-allowed labor officials to protect union wages from competition from the unemployed (Rothstein 1990 ). The Swedish Ghent system also allowed marginal workers to retain contact with unions during spells of joblessness (Western 1997) .
After abortive attempts at national unemployment insurance throughout the 1920s, the governing Social Democrats fashioned an agreement with the Swedish Liberal Party to support a Ghent system in 1934. To secure the Liberal Party's cooperation, the unemployment funds were poorly funded, subject to strict government control, and open to nonunion workers. Because of these compromises, Swedish unemployment compensation was modest by European standards. Still, Social Democrats gambled that the system would ultimately increase union membership. In 1941, the levels of insurance and government contribution expanded and many unions began to join the scheme. Throughout the postwar period, unions ensured that all members joined the insurance fund while nonunion workers who joined the fund were encouraged to take up union membership. As female and white-collar workers swelled the unemployment insurance rolls in the 1960s and 1970s, unionization among these workers also grew rapidly. In the 1990s, unionization rates held steady despite high unemployment. A modest prewar innovation in the administration of unemployment thus had large effects on the postwar growth of the Swedish labor movement.
In contrast to the dominant business cycle account, Sweden's experience suggests that unionization does not depend in a general way on economic conditions like the unemployment rate. Instead, union growth varies with the historical development of labor market institutions. Because unions gained some control over the labor supply and played a key role in the welfare of the unemployed under the Ghent system, unions were immunized from the disorganizing effects of unemployment. This example illustrates the complexity of contextual explanations. Business cycle theories view union growth as depending mainly on the unemployment rate. In Sweden, however, we can only understand the effects of economic conditions by taking additional account of the system of unemployment insurance.
Several researchers have developed methods specifically for contextual, historically sensitive, explanation. For instance, Charles Ragin's (1987) qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) uses Boolean algebra to formulate highly conjunctural causal accounts. QCA identifies clusters of causal conditions that are related to some outcome of interest. QCA's sensitivity to combinations of causes admits very complex explanations. In a comparative analysis of welfare states, QCA indicated that the adoption of welfare programs in 15 countries depended on one of three configurations of causal conditions. A typical configuration showed the causal force of paternalistic state institutions combined with working-class mobilization. but without Catholic government or a unitary democratic system (Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995) . Complex explanations of this kind can exhaustively account for all variation in the outcome of interest.
While QCA admits complex cross-sectional explanation, narrative methods can account for complex dynamic processes. Unlike the formal methods of QCA, the narrative approach consists of a diffuse collection of social theory, presentational styles, and specific techniques (e.g., Sewell 1996; Stone 1979; Somers 1998; Griffin 1993) . Narratives are stories consisting of a cast of characters with personal traits, relationships, and motives that impel social action through time and space (Tilly 1997, p. 21) . Narratives yield complex explanations by emphasizing the sequential and contingent character of events (Griffin 1992; Abbott 1990; Rueschemeyer and Stephens 1997) . Narratives are sequential in the sense that the impact of events depends on the order in which they occur (Abbott 1990 ). The ordering of events provides the context for their causal power. The idea of contingency claims that "nothing in social life is ultimately immune to change" (Sewell 1996, p. 264) . As a consequence, historical events are often unexpected, capable of undoing or altering the most durable trends of history. The role of contingency in narrative repudiates the idea of directionality in the historical process (Sewell 1996, pp. 263-64) .
Complex explanations are commonly recommended for their explanatory power and theoretical appeal. The empirical power of complex explanation is a direct product of sensitivity to historical detail. Attention to detail is sometimes inspired by the work of historians or anthropologists. Thus comparative and historical researchers identify ''actual historical causal forces" (Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993) and are committed to "thickness" in social explanation (Somers 1998, p. 739; Ortner 1996, p. 282) . QCA demonstrates the premium on explanatory completeness by attaching causal inferences to all unique combinations of causes. There is no residual, and unexplained cases are resolved by finding more complex constellations of causal conditions. Comparative case researchers take this approach too, elaborating explanations until all anomalous observations are resolved (Ragin 1987, pp. 42-44) . The empirical power of narrative is not measured by the brute facts of explained variance. Instead, narratives are viewed as intuitively attractive, capturing commonsense understandings of how social processes really work. For students of narrative, "social reality happens in sequences of actions located within constraining or enabling structures. I t is a matter of particular social actors, in particular social places, a t particular social times" (Abbott 1992, p. 428) . In short, narrative is realistic, providing a close fit between theory and humanly enacted events.
In addition to their explanatory power, complex explanations claim a theoretical affinity with the classic traditions of sociology. Karl Korsch's ([I9381 1963, pp. 24-37) Marxism argued for "historical specification" in economic explanation. Weber's rejection of highly economistic Marxisms is often taken as a much broader rejection of historical generalization (Mann 1986, p. 523; Abbott 1992, p. 430) . Abbott (1992) relates narrative methods to the processual orientation of the Chicago school. Some historical sociologists also treat the complex and unpredictable nature of social processes as a theoretical principle. For example, Visser and Ebbinghaus's (1999, p. 150 ) QCA study of unions in Western Europe takes a historical institutionalist perspective. This view "does not assume universal linear or cyclical processes but institutional combinations and path-dependent trajectories." Sewell's (1996, p. 264) historical sociology reflects a similar belief in which "social relations are characterized by path dependency, temporally heterogeneous causalities, and global contingency." Expanding the argument beyond comparative and historical research, Portes (2000, p. 7) argues that in social life generally, "goals may not be accomplished by the intended means, but by a fortuitous concatenation of events." Sensitivity to the untidiness of social life is thus seen as a distinctive element of the sociological viewpoint.
Simplicity and Scientific Understanding
The trend to complex explanation was forcefully challenged by Kiser and Hechter (1991, 1998) and Goldthorpe (1991 . Kiser and Hechter (1991) contrast the historian's commitment to descriptive accuracy with "general theory." General theories use omnitemporal laws as a source of causal propositions that describe how social processes operate under a wide variety of historical conditions. In Kiser and Hechter's analysis, rational choice offers the key example of general theory. For Goldthorpe (1991, p. 14) , "history may serve as a 'residual category' for sociology, marking the point at which sociologists . . . curb their impulse to generalize." While "historical accounts" attempt comprehensive explanations of particular cases, "theoretical accounts . . . must be selective so as to relate to factors that are generally . . . a t work across the population" (Goldthorpe 1997b, p. 130) . Just as the new macrosociology identifies causal complexity with historical specificity, the critics similarly associate parsimony with generality.
A number of techniques have been proposed to assist parsimonious explanation. The controlled experiment is the ideal method for simple explanation. Instead of identifying combinations of causal conditions, experiments narrow the focus on individual causes (King et al. 1994, pp. 196-95; cf. Ragin 1987, pp. 26-27) . Although experimental reasoning is often inexplicit, the importance of controlled comparison for simple explanation is clear. Randomization is typically impossible in macrosociology, but statistical control has become a familiar alternative (Ragin 1987, pp. 58-61) . Statistical methods may often be infeasible because few cases are available for comparison. Simple explanation then adapts the logic of quantitative analysis. Thus macrosociologists have applied the controlled comparisons of Mill's method to isolate the impact of causal factors (Skocpol 1984; Lijphart 1971) . In the boldest adaptation of statistics, King and his colleagues (1994) apply discussions of collinearity, omitted variable bias, and selectivity to the qualitative setting. Whatever the specific technique, controlled comparisons aim to pinpoint specific causes often by eliminating local context as a source of confounding variation.
Simple explanations are justified differently from complex explanations. Complex accounts invoke theoretical arguments for historical sensitivity and are crafted to fit closely the observed data. Simple explanations are often justified by a model of scientific inquiry. Kiser and Hechter (1991, p. 9) argue that general theory is scientifically attractive because it generates many testable implications. In comparative and historical research where data are scarce, general theories offer ample opportunity for falsification. The falsifiability of simple explanations is often contrasted with the malleability of complex accounts. Unlike parsimonious explanations, complex stories can accommodate new data by incremental modification. Such fine-tuning, however, shields complex explanations from disconfirmation. In the limit, fine-tuning may yield "a useless hodge-podge of exceptions and exclusions" (King et al. 1994, p. 104) . Where complexity in historical explanation is raised to a theoretical principle, the possibility of falsification may be deflected altogether (Kiser and Hechter 1991, P 9) .
Critics also claim that only simple explanations can sustain strong conclusions. Generalizing the idea of the identification of statistical parameters, King and his colleagues (1994, p. 119) warn of the difficulties of supporting complex explanations with small samples: "Each observation can help us make one inference at most" (King et al. 1994, p. 119) . They add that strong inferences depend on many cases, not just one. From this perspective, an intricate narrative account that culminates in a single event of interest provides weak evidence of the causes of that event. Goldthorpe (1997a, p. 8 ) makes a similar point in relation to QCA. "The small N problem is not one of method but one of data . . . it is a problem of insufficient information relative to the complexity of the macrosociological questions that we seek to address" (Goldthorpe 1997a, p. 8; original emphasis) . These arguments adopt a statistical idea of evidence in which support for an explanation grows with the accumulation of independent information consistent with that explanation. Somers (1998, p. 761) claims that the chief appeal of parsimonious explanation is aesthetic. The aesthetic appeal of parsimony is clear in the physical sciences. Isaac Newton argued that We are to admit not more causes of things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose the Philosophers say that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes. (Quoted in Beck 1943, pp. 618-19) Modern physicists are also credited with the belief that the world has a simple, discoverable structure. The statistical astronomer, Harold Jeffreys (1961, p. 47) , describes a simplicity postulate, which states that simpler laws are more likely a priori. Developing this idea in a statistical context, Jeffreys (1961, p. 342) later enlists William of Occam in support of the idea that "all variation is random until the contrary is shown." A frankly aesthetic sensibility is revealed by the physicist Paul Dirac, who claimed that "a theory with mathematical beauty is more likely to be correct than an ugly one that fits some experimental data" (MacKay 1995, p. 470) . This belief in the simplicity of nature contrasts strikingly with the sociological belief in the complexity of social life.
Should macrosociologists prefer simple or complex explanations? This could be treated as a purely empirical question. Because complex explanations are tuned to fit the observed facts they will tend to be more complete than simple explanations. Still, if the explanatory power of simple explanations was sufficiently close to that of a complex explanation we might prefer the simpler approach. The idea of a trade-off between explanatory power and explanatory complexity was detailed by Przeworski and Teune (197 1, p. 2 11) and Heckathorn (1984) . Their discussions suggest that in real analyses, an optimal point could be found that balances complexity and explanatory power. Both sides of the complexity debate in macrosociology would probably agree if such an empirical test could be devised for a given research question, the chips should fall where they may.
However the methodologists in macrosociology debate whether simple or complex explanations can be preferred in principle, before the data have been observed. The debate offers little resolution because the two camps use different criteria for evaluating social explanations. The empirical detail prized in contextual explanation is criticized as a method for evading falsification. The critics also charge that complex sociological theories fail to generate strong evidence. Historicists counter that the generalists have bad taste in theory matched only by their poor taste in austere explanation. Simple explanations fail by the standards used to judge complex explanations, and complex explanations fail by the standards of parsimony. Despite substantial discussion, there has been little systematic effort to weigh the arguments for simple and complex explanation and little compromise.
Theoretical disagreement has obstructed progress. My approach is narrowly methodological and indifferent to sociological theory. I think sociological theory offers little for understanding the merits of simple and complex explanations, and the quality of theory is fundamentally an empirical question. For example, Kiser and Hechter (1991) argue that theories should always specify causal relations, but Somers (1998) may disagree. My analysis assumes that if there is some advantage in causal theories (or any substantive approach), this will be reflected empirically. I do not mean to imply that theoretical discussion is generally unimportant. The debate on macrosociological methods has usefully discussed whether some kinds of theories yield more constructive programs of research, but this question is beyond the current scope.
BAYESIAN ASSESSMENT O F EXPLANATIONS
Bayesian statistics apply elementary rules of probability to provide a method for learning from data. Bayesian analysis begins with a priori beliefs about a theory that are updated by data to form an a posteriori conclusion. Imposing the discipline of probability theory ensures that our beliefs are rational and coherent in a technical sense. Bayesian analysis yields rational beliefs that conform to commonsense axioms about the ordering of preferences (Berger 1985, p. 49) . Complying with the rules of probability also offers a coherent way of gambling on our theories. If we took bets on our theories, the Bayesian odds are guaranteed not to lose money under some quite general conditions (Howson and Urbach 1993, pp. 78-86) .* Bayesian probability differs from the dominant, frequentist probability concept in sociology (Berk, Western, and Weiss 1994) . Frequentist probability describes the behavior of a statistic over a large number of repeated trials. Frequentist probability thus describes a class of cases. Bayesian probability describes a researcher's degree of belief in a theory, conditional on observing particular cases. Consistent with the paradigm of complex explanation, the data have identity for the Bayesian. Bayesian conclusions refer to specific cases, and not a general class from which those cases might be drawn.
I begin a Bayesian assessment of explanations by viewing theories as conditional probability statements. A conditional probability is written P(D1A) and is read as "the probability of D given A," We can think of P(D1A) as the likelihood of observing certain data, D, given that theory A is true. Equivalently, P(DIA) describes the data predicted by the theory. Thinking about postwar Swedish union growth, the institutional theory claims the causal importance of the Ghent system and the economic variables thought to influence unionization. In the language of conditional probability, given the Ghent system and economic conditions in postwar Sweden (theory A), we would expect to observe a high level of union organization (the data, D). Here, theory refers to any statement that allocates probabilities to observations. The framework is very general, Of course, choosing rationally among theories provides no special advantage to rational choice theory. As one reviewer observed, if people behave irrationally, then a social scientist will not rationally select a theory that predicts rational behavior. allowing everything from regression equations to narratives to count as theories. To come under the Bayesian umbrella, researchers need only describe what they would expect to observe (D) if the theory (A) were true.
Because P(D1A) is a probability statement, it allows that some predictions may be more or less likely, not just possible or impossible. Theories in this approach are thus nondeterministic. As a probability, P(DIA) quantifies uncertainty about the data with a number between zero and one. The theory of Swedish unionization may say that, given a Ghent system of unemployment insurance under postwar economic conditions, there is an 80% chance of high unionization, while only a 20% chance of union weakness. Of course, we can cast this theory in deterministic terms by specifying a probability of "1" if the causal conditions are met and "0" otherwise.
The idea of theory as a conditional probability statement has an eminent tradition. Weber (1949, p. 183) cautions that it may be impractical to assign precise numerical probabilities to predictions, but argues that the causal explanation of historical fact involves an assessment of the likelihood of various "objective possibilities." He writes that "we can . . . render generally valid judgments which assert that as a result of certain situations, the occurrence of a type of reaction, . . . is 'favored' to a more or less high degree." In a modern context, Stinchcombe (1968, p. 16 ) also takes a conditional view of the relationship between theory and data. If Durkheim's theory of egoistic suicide is true, he reasons, we would expect French Protestants to have higher rates of suicide than French Catholics, Protestant regions of German provinces to have higher rates of suicide than Catholic regions, and so on. A probabilistic element is injected into this conditional thinking by acknowledging that the data's inconsistency with theory may be due to the impact of "a large number of small unorganized causes" (Stinchcombe 1968, p. 23) .
While a theory assigns probabilities to data that we might observe, we are really interested in how credible a theory is in light of data we have observed. In other words, the theory describes P(DIA), but our interest centers on P(AID), the probability that theory A is true given some data. Using a basic rule of probability, called the conditional probability rule or Bayes rule, we can write
The new terms here are P(A), read as "the marginal probability of A," and P(D), "the marginal probability of D." In Bayesian statistics these quantities describe the unconditional probability of observing some data, D and the credence of theory A before the data are observed. The credibility of theory A before the data are observed is called the prior probability of A. The quantity describing the credibility of theory A after the data are observed, P(AID), is called the posterior probability of A. In the Bayesian model of learning, the data transform prior probabilities of theories into posterior probabilities. This logic is fundamentally prospective: data are used to modify existing beliefs.
Marginal probabilities can be calculated from conditional probabilities by using the sum rule of probability:
The summation sign indicates that we are summing over different values of A. Say A is a dummy variable that can equal 1 or 0, perhaps indicating whether A is true or false; then the marginal probability of D is given by This operation is called marginalization. It allows us to describe our uncertainty about one quantity, D in this case, while allowing for uncertainty about another, A.
When will some theory A be more complicated than an alternative, theory B? I define the complexity of a theory by the number of uncertain parameters it implies. This definition captures the key point of contention among social scientists. In the methodological debates of macrosociology, complex explanations usually feature many causal variables. We can think of the effects of these variables as unobserved quantities, or parameters. Explanatory complexity has been used in this sense to distinguish Mill's method from narrative. Mill's method produces parsimonious explanations by reducing the number of explanatory variables. Narrative contributes to causal complexity by multiplying the number of explanatory factors (Mahoney 1999) . Complex and simple explanation is also illustrated by the example of Swedish union growth. The institutional account of Swedish unions emphasizes the influence of the Ghent system of unemployment insurance in addition to the unemployment rate. This twovariable explanation contrasts with the standard economic account that focuses just on unemployment. The institutional account rests on inferences about two causal effects in contrast to the one effect implied by the economic theory.
Although the Bayesian analysis defines complexity in terms of the number of uncertain parameters, other definitions are possible. Complexity could be defined by the number of assumptions an explanation requires. The disadvantages of this type of complexity are uncontroversial. Few macrosociologists make a virtue of spouting untested assumptions. Indeed, theories are criticized, not commended, for relying on elaborate lists of assumptions. More commonly, some argue that the outcome to be explained-not the explanation-varies critically in its complexity (e.g., Sewell 1996; Portes 1994) . France in 1789 and Russia in 1917 might be scored identically to test a general theory of revolutions. However, a more historically sensitive account would be drawn to explain the numerous differences between the two cases. The following analysis is very general, and the conclusions apply regardless of whether the object of explanation is simple and unidimensional or complex and multidimensional. However, if the debate about parsimony and complexity is fundamentally a dispute about the appropriate object of explanation, any rules for interpreting empirical evidence-including Bayes rule-has little to contribute. In sum, my definition of complexity is not universal, but it does capture a central axis of debate, and it covers a broad class of macrosociological research problems. Now I am in a position to evaluate simple and complex explanations from a Bayesian perspective (see Gull 1988; Mackay 1995) . To assess the relative support for theory A compared to B we can use equation (1) above to write the posterior odds, where terms for the marginal probability of the data, P(D), cancel out. The posterior odds consists of two terms. The right-hand term, P(A)IP(B), is the ratio of prior probabilities, and this ratio expresses the researcher's relative belief in theory A compared to theory B before observing the data. In this analysis we are trying to decide between two theories, without a prior preference for one or the other. We thus regard A and B as equally likely, and the prior ratio is set to 1. Posterior support for one model or another then depends on the conditional probabilities of the data under each model, P(DIA)IP(DIB). These conditional probabilities describe how well the data are predicted by each model. The ratio of conditional probabilities is called the Bayes factor.
The Bayes factor prefers simple models. To explain this preference, consider the example illustrated in figure 1. Say we have a bag with poker chips marked "1" and "2 ." We know that the bag contains an equal number of Is and 2s. Two theories are proposed to explain the contents of the bag. Theory A assumes the bag contains just two chips. The more complex theory B proposes that the number of chips, N, may be two or four. Theory B is more complicated in the sense that it has more parameters than theory A. Theory A has no parameters, but theory B is uncertain about the number of chips, IV. Now come the data: two chips are drawn from the bag, first a "1" and then a "2," which we write as the ordered pair, D = {1,2). Do these data provide stronger support for the simple or the complex theory? Under the simple theory A, the probability of drawing a "1" first is one out of two or one-half. If A is true, once a "1" is drawn, only a "2" remains and this will be drawn with certainty. So the conditional probability of the data under theory A is P(D1A) = x 1 = i.Under theory B we have to consider the conditional probability of the data under the scenario that N equals two or four. For N = 2 , we have already calculated the conditional probability of one-half. For N = 4, the probability of drawing a "1" first is one-half. If a "1" is drawn, three chips remain and the probability of drawing a "2" is two-thirds. With four chips, the probability of {1,2) is then f x = i.Thus P(DIN = 2 ) = f and P(DIN = 4) = 3. TO calculate the probability of the data given that N = 2 or N = 4, we have to specify a probability for the parameter N . If previous research does not point strongly to either the two-chip or the four-chip scenario, we could assign N = 2 and N = 4 the same prior probability.
Applying the sum rule to obtain the marginal predictive distribution for the data, The Bayesian calculations show that the data are more probable under the simpler explanation, P(D1A) = i,than under the complex explanation, P(D1B) = A. The Bayes factor, the ratio of the evidence under each theory, equals $ indicating that the data are 20% more probable under the simple explanation than the complex. If explanations A and B are equally likely a priori, the simple explanation, theory A , has greater posterior probability. In the current example, theory A has posterior probability .545 and theory B has posterior probability .455. The posterior odds depend on the assumption that N = 2 and N = 4 are equally likely a priori under theory B, but the general result that posterior odds favor the simple theory is insensitive to the choice of prior on N (see the appendix). Although this example is elementary the same idea has been shown for more complicated problems (Gull 1988) .
The example provides our first main conclusion: When two explanations account equally well for the observed data, we can prefer the simpler explanation because it has higher posterior probability. Bayesian reasoning thus provides a rational justification for the principle of parsimony. The superior credence of the simple theory does not depend on an aesthetic commitment to the elegance of nature or scientific explanation. I n the current example, the analysis was indifferent to the simple and complex explanations before the data were observed. The simple explanation was rewarded in this case because the probability calculus rewards sharp predictions that are consistent with the data. Although this conclusion supports the parsimonious approach, simple explanations should not generally be preferred to complex explanations. Simple explanations are clearly preferred over the complex when both account for the observed data equally well. Since complex explanations claim a close fit between theory and data, complex accounts may be justified in practice by their superior explanatory power. In qualitative historical research there are no clear rules for deciding when a gain in explanatory power is sufficiently large to prefer a complex theory over its simple alternative. I t may thus be prudent to prefer simple explanations, except when they confront clear empirical anomalies.
This result also highlights the importance of systematically assessing the fit between theory and data. This task is assisted by stating the empirical implications of a theory as precisely as possible. The fit of a theory could then be assessed by reporting the divergence between these empirical implications and the observed data. In the example below, I study the theory that union-controlled unemployment insurance increases the unionization rate in Sweden. The theory could be further sharpened by defining a "high unionization rate." One definition would require that the Swedish unionization rate exceed the unionization rates in countries with public unemployment insurance. The theory fits the data to the extent that this definition is satisfied empirically. Why do simple explanations have high posterior probability? Simple theories yield simple predictions (MacKay 1995, p. 472) . Complex theories must spread their probability over a broad range of outcomes. Figure 2 illustrates this idea. Theory A, which assumes there are two chips in the bag, can only predict the outcomes (1,2) and (2,l). The complex theory B entertains a richer variety of predictions, including(1,l) and (2,2). Drawing two chips with the same number received zero probability under theory A, but received some positive probability under theory B. Again, this can sharpen our intuitions about comparative explanation. Complex theories tend to be more open-ended, adapting to a wide variety of possible outcomes. The predictions of simple theories are much sharper, but simple theories have a higher risk of encountering inexplicable outcomes.
Marginal predictive distributions shed light on the falsifiability of simple explanations. It is often claimed that simple explanations are more testable or easier to falsify (Kiser and Hechter 1991; King et al. 1994; Goldthorpe 199 1) . Because their marginal predictive distributions are concentrated, simple theories sharply discriminate between supportive and unsupportive data. Observations under a simple theory either yield strong evidence or weak evidence. Data are less informative about the credibility of complex theories. The predictive distributions of complex theories are dispersed, so data can provide neither compelling support nor clear disconfirmation. Simple theories are strongly falsifiable in the sense of having narrow predictive distributions.
The strong falsifiability of simple explanations also assists in deciding among rival theories. When drawing chips from the bag, obtaining two chips with the same number would eliminate support for A and markedly increase the relative support for B. The additional evidence is important because it has relatively high probability under one theory but low probability under the alternative. Consequently, the additional evidence sharply discriminates between the theories (see also Stinchcombe 1968, pp. 24-28) . This suggests an optimistic conclusion. Because complex explanations make diffuse predictions but simple explanations concentrate their predictive probability in a narrow regions, predictions will usually be available that are consistent with one theory but highly unlikely under the other. The relative utility of simple versus complex theories is thus a strongly testable proposition.
Although it is often claimed as such, falsifiability is not an unambiguous advantage. Because a simple theory predicts a narrow range of outcomes, the area of unexplained events is large. A large range of observations will have very low probability under a simple theory, but higher probability under a complex theory. This implies our second conclusion: Because marginal predictive distributions of simple theories are concentrated, simple theories are not just "more falsifiable," they are more likely to be falsified.
The clear falsifiability of simple explanations may help explain charges of their ex post formulation. This criticism is leveled at empirical applications of rational choice theory (Somers 1998, p. 761; Green and Shapiro 1994, pp. 34-38) . The embarrassment of null findings may be relatively familiar for rational choice theorists whose simple theories make precise predictions. Thus Fiorina and Shepsle (1982, p. 63) observe that rational choice theories offered ex ante may say little about the "world of phenomena." Rational choice interpretation may often be offered after the data are observed in order to report some news about empirical observation. (Of course any post hoc interpretation of data-rational choice or otherwise-falls outside the rules for evaluating evidence described here.)
The marginal predictive distributions suggest that complex explanations deflect falsification differently. While simple explanations yield sharp predictions, researchers often acknowledge that complex, historically spe-cific theories are weakly predictive. An explanation consisting of a large number of causal factors whose effects are uncertain leads to vague predictions in which a wide variety of outcomes may be possible. The extreme case of this explanatory complexity can be seen in discussions of historical contingency. The idea of contingency in historical explanation sometimes implies unpredictability, not just conditionality (Quadagno and Knapp 1992, p. 502; Portes 1994; Zeitlin 1984, pp. 20, 235; Griffin 1992, p. 405) . Kiser (1996, p. 252 ) describes this as an "ontology of contingency." For instance, Sewell's (1996, p. 264) eventful sociology is "inherently unpredictable." Somers's (1998, p. 769) refers to the "contingent and indeterminate nature" of causal mechanisms. The elevation of unpredictability to an explanatory principle-while perhaps resonating with intuitions about historical processes-comes a t a cost. Because the predictive distributions of complex theories are not strongly peaked, the most likely predictions of a complex theory will be less probable than the most likely predictions of a simple theory. Consequently, open-ended theories that entertain a broad array of possible events cannot sustain strong conclusions. The Bayesian analysis thus supplies greater precision to the common claim that comparative and historical data are insufficient for supporting complicated explanations (Goldthorpe 1997a; King et al. 1994 ). This can be restated as the third conclusion of the Bayesian analysis: Because the marginal predictive distribution of a complex theory is relatively dispersed, our most confident conclusions about a complex theory of some event can never be as strong as our most confident conclusions about a simple theory of that same event.
The discussion so far suggests significant challenges to advancing complex explanations in macrosociology successfully. I t will often be impractical to measure precisely the relative explanatory power of complex and simple explanations in a qualitative historical setting. Furthermore, support for complex theories tends to be relatively weak. Given these obstacles, how can we draw confident conclusions about complex theories?
Consider the accumulation of evidence through multiple experiments. Multiple empirical tests are commonly recommended in discussions of comparative and historical methods. Multiple tests expand variation on independent and dependent variables and help control rival sources of variation (Stinchcombe 1968; Skocpol 1984; Campbell 1975; Smelser 1976 ). Kiser and Hechter (1998) argue that scope conditions for a theory must be defined abstractly to enable a variety of empirical tests. From this viewpoint multiple tests are important because they "increase the generalizability of explanations" (Kiser and Hechter 1998, p. 797) . Although multiple tests are important in the Bayesian analysis, theoretical generality is not an objective of Bayesian inference. Like more idiographic approaches, cases have identity in the Bayesian approach. Bayesian in-ference focuses on explaining a particular case, not a general class of cases. By sharpening prior information through multiple tests, the Bayesian improves understanding of particular cases.
Say we conduct another experiment by drawing two more chips from another bag, Bayes rule can be applied again to calculate the posterior probability of the theories A and B. We approach this second calculation with the benefit of information obtained from the first experiment. For experiment 2 , the prior odds of the two theories, P(A)IP(B), are now given by the posterior odds obtained from experiment 1. For theory B in experiment 2 , the prior probability that A: = 2 and N = 4 are revised in light of evidence from the first experiment. In approaching experiment 2 , theory A is now preferred to theory B a priori, and under theory B, A: = 2 has greater prior probability than A: = 4. Now assume that experiment 2 yields the same data as experiment 1, D = {1,2}. Repeating the calculations of experiment 1 with these new data shows that posterior belief in A compared to B has increased from $ to g.As evidence accumulates for one theory over another, the posterior probability of that theory also increases.
Although the two experiments in this example favor the simple theory A over the complex theory B, the accumulation of data also induces a change in the predictions of theory B. The probability of each possible outcome under theory B can be updated as new data arrive. Figure 3 shows the marginal predictive distribution of theory B before experiment 1 and after experiment 7, where every experiment yields the result {1,2] or (2,lj. As more data arrive, evidence concentrates in the center of the range of possible outcomes, and the extreme outcomes, {1,1] and {2,2], are becoming less likely. The marginal predictive distribution becomes more concentrated because the probability that N = 2 increases with each experiment. By experiment 7, the probability that N = 2 is 9576, nearly double the prior probability of 50% before experiment 1. The accumulation of consistent data thus leads the marginal predictive distribution of the complex theory B to increasingly resemble the marginal predictive distribution of the simple theory A . As consistent evidence accumulates, the observed data become more probable under the complex theory, and we become more sure about the values of unknown parameters. The sequential application of Bayes rule provides our fourth conclusion: Confident conclusions about complex theories require multiple empirical tests.
In sum, the Bayesian approach admits a strong compromise in the debate over explanatory complexity. The preference for simple explanation is strongly justified by the probability calculus in the special case where a complex alternative fits the data equally well. Simple explanations also have the advantage-consistent with Goldthorpe (1997~) and King et al. (1994) -of yielding potentially stronger conclusions. This is not an unambiguous advantage of parsimony however, because simple explanations also face a relatively high risk of disconfirmation. Still, the conclusion that our most confident inferences about a complex theory can never be as strong as our most confident inferences about a simple theory should be troubling for those whose sociological theory emphasizes the conjunctural and contingent character of historical events. To boost our confidence in such complex theories, we must-as comparative and historical researchers are often advised-perform multiple empirical tests. Such multiple tests are important, not for establishing the generality of a theory but for drawing strong conclusions about theories of specific cases.
AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION: SWEDISH UNION GROWTH
Postwar Swedish union growth can be explained by a historical institutionalist theory that emphasizes the role of the Ghent system and a business cycle explanation that focuses on the impact of unemployment. The institutional and business cycle theories vary in their complexity. The business cycle explanation is simple: unemployment reduces unionization because union membership provides few benefits and is costly during spells of unemployment. This simple explanation yields the sharp pre-diction that unemployment reduces unionization everywhere. The institutional account is relatively complex. Unionization may be low or high when unemployment is high, depending on the administrative form of unemployment insurance. The institutional and business cycle explanations appear to provide equally good accounts of Swedish unionization. Consistent with the data, both theories predict high rates of unionization in Sweden. We should then favor the business cycle account, because it has higher posterior probability.
Should we stop here? The Bayesian analysis indicates that we can distinguish the theories more sharply by considering more evidence. In particular, a strong inference about the more-complex institutional theory depends on additional empirical tests. The first column of table 1 reports some estimates from a regression of the annual change in unionization on unemployment from a sample of 18 countries for the period 1950-85. We would expect that the association between unemployment and unionization is weak in Ghent system countries but strongly negative elsewhere. The results are inconclusive. Large negative unemployment effects can only be found in countries with public unemployment insurance. Still some unemployment effects are close to zero in the public-insurance countries, and small negative unemployment effects can be found in two of the countries with Ghent systems. In this case, the institutional theory may edge the business cycle approach, but our confidence in the more complex account is rather low.
The institutional theory suggests that those a t high risk of unemployment will be highly unionized in Ghent system countries. Table 1 provides some support, showing coefficients from a logistic regression of union membership on demographic and work characteristics using survey data from 10 countries. The table reports coefficients for young workers, 35 years old and younger, who have a relatively high risk of unemployment. Consistent with the Ghent system hypothesis, small logistic regression coefficients indicate that unionization rates for young workers are similar to those for middle-aged workers in Ghent system countries but not elsewhere. The final column of table 1 provides additional support, showing that unionization rates are much higher among the unemployed in Ghent system countries. All these results are consistent with the Ghent system hypothesis.
Quasi-experiments are also useful. We can contrast the historical experience of Sweden and Norway. The two countries share structurally similar union movements, a similar cultural heritage, and ethnic homogeneity. The Norwegian Ghent system was replaced by state unemployment insurance in 1938, and since then Swedish union density has continuously exceeded the Norwegian by 20 to 30 percentage points. Belgium and the Netherlands provide another paired comparison. Industrial re- United States ......
NOTE.-Unemployment coefficients are from a time-series regression of the annual change in the percentage unionized on unemployment and other variables, 195&85 (Western 1997) ; youth coefficients are from a logistic regression of survey data on union membership on demographic and work characteristics (Western 1997) ; unionization for employed and unemployed workers is reported by Scruggs (1999). lations are similarly structured in the two countries, but the Netherlands abandoned its Ghent system shortly after the war. Unionization rates in the two countries diverged from the early 1950s. Finally, we can also examine differences in unionization across industries within the Dutch labor market. Although compulsory state unemployment insurance was established in 1952, construction unions retained control over unemployment insurance and unionization rates in the building trades remained relatively high (Western 1997, p. 58) . In sum, econometric evidence, the Sweden-Norway and Belgium-Netherlands comparisons, and interindustry trends in Dutch unionization support the theory that the Ghent system nullifies the negative impact of unemployment and promotes unionism. With this additional information, we can be more confident that strong growth in Swedish unions reflects the influence of the Ghent system rather than low unemployment.
This example also indicates the importance of discriminating evidence. For the union membership example, additional empirical test. were not simply replications of the analysis of the Swedish data. I also examined variations in union membership by age, employment status, industry, and under conditions of institutional change. I would have expected the Ghent system to reduce heterogeneity in union membership within national labor markets and increase union membership relative to similar countries with public unemployment insurance. None of these predictions arise under the unemployment-rate account of unionization. These supplementary tests support the institutional explanation while reducing the credibility of the economic explanation. As we saw in the Bayesian analysis, such discriminating evidence can powerfully support one theory over another.
I t may be objected that the Ghent system theory is simple compared to many of the narrative accounts of historical sociology. As explanations become highly particularistic, multiple empirical tests may be impossible. Two counterexamples challenge this argument. Paige's (1999) recent discussion of the effect of communist leadership on union radicalism is more complex and may be closer to the explanatory norms of historical sociology. In addition to communist union leadership, Paige emphasizes the influence of worker insurgency, employer intransigence, and severe economic recession. His account joins a case study of U.S. longshoremen, an analysis of 38 CIO unions in the 1930s, and case studies of Costa Rica and El Salvador. The Bayesian perspective shows that results from each one of these studies helps reinforce our confidence in the others. The limiting example might be provided by the historian, Simon Schama (1991). Schama's Dead Certainties recounts the deaths of two different individuals in two different episodes. Each episode consists of several narratives, each written from the viewpoint of a different protagonist. Although this case is unambiguously idiographic, each narrative provides a separate empirical test that influences our credence in the other accounts. Schama's narratives frequently diverge, leaving readers uncertain about the sequence of events leading to the deaths in question.
CONCLUSION
This article says nothing about the specific merits of general theory or conjunctural explanation, narrative or regression analysis, QCA or Mill's method. Instead, the analysis provides a unified framework for identifying the costs associated with simple and complex explanations that are generally unacknowledged by their proponents. Complex explanations-perhaps based on narrative analysis and historically conditional theory-are relatively uncertain. Contextual explanations that are tailored to the details of specific events will tend to have relatively little credence unless they are supported by additional evidence from comparative cases. The historic turn in macrosociology thus faces the challenge that contextual theories must have some generality to account convincingly for local context. Simple explanations-perhaps based on regression analysis of general theory-run a high risk of falsification. The risk of falsification highlights the limited generality of simple explanations. Although a few cases may be found that conform to the sharp predictions of general theory, the uncomfortable facts of local context will tend to accumulate. Put another way, because general explanations make sharp predictions, they are unlikely to have general application. While both sides of the debate are frustrated by the shortcomings they see in the positions of their opponents, empirical research may provide some resolution. Proponents of simple explanation will have made their point if their theories can survive the acute likelihood of falsification. Contextual explanations will only satisfy reasonable standards of evidence if they can successfully enlist the support of comparative cases.
Is it better to propose complex or simple explanations? The Bayesian approach offers no specific guidance. Parsimony should be preferred over complexity when two explanations account equally well for the observed data. This preference is not due to a taste for elegant explanations. When simple and complex explanations provide equally good accounts of the observed data, simple explanations have higher posterior probability. However, in most real empirical analysis, two explanations will not provide identical accounts of the observed data. If the simple explanation provides the better account, it will definitely have higher posterior probability. More commonly, however, the complex explanation provides the better account, and the explanatory gain must be sufficiently large to justify the additional complexity.
This explanatory gain is difficult to assess in a qualitative setting. To be more confident of the complex explanation in this situation it is necessary to sharpen prior information. We can do this by conducting multiple tests, studying a range of empirical implications of a given theory. The importance of multiple tests has an important place in the canon of comparative methods. In many cases, the appeal of multiple tests is essentially negative; multiple tests allow many opportunities for disconfirmation of a theory (Stinchcombe 1968, p. 19; Lijphart 1971, p. 686; Smelser 1976, pp. 200-202; King et al. 1994, p. 19) . The Bayesian justification for multiple tests comes from the other direction. Because our most confident inferences about complex explanations can never be as strong as our most confident inferences about simple explanations, we need multiple tests to strengthen our belief in complex accounts. To understand the role of unemployment administration in shaping Swedish union growth, we looked to the experience of other countries. The Bayesian outlook underlines the fundamental rationale of comparative research: to learn about one setting, we must necessarily examine others. and ( 1 -a) .The priors sum to 1 because they are probabilities. The marginal predictive distribution for the complex theory is Theory B gives positive probability to N = 2 and N = 4, so 0 < a < 1 and Because P(DIA) = i, the Bayes factor P(DIA)/P(DIB) > I , favoring the simple theory regardless of prior.
